Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 8

Issue 3

Article 2

7-1-1991

An Attack on C. S. Lewis
Hugo Meynell

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Meynell, Hugo (1991) "An Attack on C. S. Lewis," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers: Vol. 8 : Iss. 3 , Article 2.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19918330
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol8/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

AN ATTACK ON C. S. LEWIS
Hugo Meynell

Beversluis' book is the first full-length philosophical assessment of C. S.
Lewis's defence of Christianity. It argues that Lewis's arguments from desire,
morality and reason all fail. This article concedes that the argument from
desire fails, and that the argument from morality does not show what Lewis
appears to have thought. But it is maintained that the argument from reason
is sound, and given that it is so, that morality and unsatisfied desire may be
regarded as signs of the existence and nature of God, even if they are not
bases of proofs strictly speaking of divine existence.

The popular literature on C. S. Lewis, from the first, has tended to run to
excessive adulation; yet his Christian apologetics have usually been dismissed out of hand by serious philosophers and theologians. Neither attitude,
as it seems to me, properly takes Lewis's measure; Professor John Beversluis'
book, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, I has the great merit
that it does so. For better or for worse, Lewis's influence as a Christian
apologist has been very great, and it was high time that his arguments on this
matter were given a sustained and serious look.
I do not wish to give much attention to the common claim that, for a
Christian, apologetics is an unnecessary as well as a fruitless enterprise. All
the ingenuity of writers like Soren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth notwithstanding, I agree with Lewis and many atheists that, unless a rational case can be
made for theism or Christianity, which does not assume what it has to prove,
then one ought not to be a theist or a Christian.
Of the arguments for Christianity advanced by Lewis and attacked by
Beversluis, I want in what follows to give pride of place to two, that from
the alleged "objectivity" of morality and that from the place of reason in the
universe, to the existence of God.
As Lewis sees it, it is only as a result of inconsistency that people can
regard their moral conscience as both reducible to a "subjective" feeling or
attitude, and binding upon them in the kind of way that they have to do if
they are to be morally responsible beings. 2 If moral conscience were merely
a matter of "subjective" feeling or attitude, why should it not be quite appropriate to overcome or to act against this feeling when it interferes with our
convenience, our pleasure, or our peace of mind, as of course notoriously it
often does? That the "subjective" feeling or attitude may be shared with many
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other people is not to the point; why should such feelings and attitudes in
others impose moral obligation on me, any more than my own?
It might well be pointed out, on Lewis's behalf, that we are apt to assume that
the "subjectivist" position in morality is a coherent one, just because so many
admirable and influential persons have maintained it. Why have they done so?
Very simply and crudely, the train of thought seems to run something like this.
Scientific verification is the hallmark of objectivity; moral and other value-judgments are not subject to scientific verification; therefore moral and other valuejudgments are not objective. And yet to take morality seriously is surely, as
Lewis says (and Beversluis does not deny) to set some kind of constraint on how
it is appropriate for us to act, just as to take truth seriously does on what it is
appropriate for us to believe. How could a merely "subjective" feeling set such
a constraint? Beversluis is quite correct that, on moral matters, we take our
feelings more seriously, and expect others to do so, than we do in the case of
our liking or disliking of some kind of food, and he accordingly resents Lewis
drawing the parallel. 3 But why should this make them any more binding, on
ourselves or anyone else? When there is a collision between these feelings and
our other inclinations, why should we follow these feelings, let alone expect
others to come to share the feelings when they do not already do so? I cannot
help concluding that for all Beversluis' arguments on this issue, and for all his
reproaches of Lewis for arguing unsoundly, he has missed Lewis's basic point,
or at least failed to realize its force. That we tend to feel more strongly about
moral matters than we do about mere matters of taste is certainly true; but this
does not appear to be to the point.
Beversluis is quite correct in maintaining that, even if "subjective" views
of morality are held to be unsatisfactory, there are many "objective" views. 4
But Lewis's claim is that belief in the objectivity of morality itself provides
some kind of grounds for theism; in this case, the objection that there are
many kinds of moral objectivism is not to the point. What Beversluis has to
show is that, according to some "objectivist" understandings of the essence
of morality, the objectivity of morality does not provide grounds for theism
in the manner that Lewis suggests. Lewis himself is just as hostile as
Beversluis to the notion that the only proper basis for morality is revealed
divine command; on the contrary, he maintains that we have to have a notion
of what is good and bad already, if we are to have a rational basis for assessing
any candidate for the status of divine revelation.
Beversluis charges Lewis with tendentiousness in speaking of subjective
views of morality as "merely" subjective. s Yet I cannot see that it is really
misleading of Lewis to speak in this way. A moral system which was partly
a matter of "subjective" feeling, but which also depended to some extent on
more "objective" criteria, would be more properly referred to as a mixture
of "subjective" and objective, than as subjective sans phrase. An account of
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morality which is merely referred to as subjective, without qualification,
surely is properly to be taken as merely subjective.
What of the connection alleged by Lewis between an "objective" view of
morality and theism? If there were a Creator God, Lewis maintains, an objective
moral law whose demand we feel within us, which we cannot with full consistency treat at once with appropriate seriousness, and merely as a matter of
sUbjective feeling, would be par excellence the suitable way for him to make his
existence known to us. 6 Beversluis accuses Lewis of inconsistency at this point;
he cannot say both that an objective moral law which we apprehend within
ourselves is the only way in which a Creator could reveal himself within his own
creation, and, in accordance with orthodox Christianity, that God has revealed
himself in history.7 But the contradiction, granted that Lewis commits himself
to it in his writings, is not a serious one. It is an important part of Lewis's overall
position that a divine revelation could properly commend itself to humankind
only by confirming what they themselves knew to be their best moral intuitions.
Once the moral law has established, so to say, a bridgehead for theism, a historical revelation might follow upon its heels.
If Lewis thought that our need, if we were both thoroughly consistent and
fully moral beings, to take for granted that the moral law is in a sense
"objective," established its objectivity in this sense, then I believe he was
wrong. The moral law might not after all be objective; even if it were the
case that, if we were to be both fully consistent and fully moral, we had to
believe that it was so. Again, the move to theism seems rather suggestive
than compelling. One may grant that, if there were a Creator who wished to
reveal his will to us, an objective moral law inscribed within our consciences
would be an appropriate way for him to do so. The existence of such a thing
might thus be a pointer to the existence of such a Creator, without itself
constituting any more than a rather weak argument for his existence. One
might think of the way in which a particular action by someone might be a
pointer to her character, without being a proof that she had such a character;
the actual failure to constitute a proof would not imply that it was totally
irrelevant to the matter. As Beversluis says, it is not quite clear from Lewis's
writings what kind of status he wished this argument to have;8 I am inclined
to say that, taken in the kind of way that I have suggested, Lewis's argument
has some force, though it certainly needs supplementation if an adequate case
for theism is to be made. Such a supplementary argument is in fact supplied
by Lewis, in his claim that the place of reason in the universe can only be
accounted for properly if the universe is due to an intelligent will such as we
call God. To this argument we now turn.
The scientific world-view is often supposed to entail that reason, as we find
it operative in human beings, is a chance by-product of a system of causes which
themselves have nothing to do with reason. According to Lewis, this conc\u-
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sion cannot be true. 9 The scientific world-view itself, after all, depends on
scientists speaking and writing as they do for good reasons; and on the world
having an overall nature and structure which enables it to be known as a result
of such reasoning. As Lewis says, "Unless we can be sure that reality in the
remotest nebula ... obeys the thought-laws of the human scientist here and now
in his laboratory-in other words, unless Reason is an absolute-all (sc. of
the scientific world picture) is in ruins. "10 I have argued at length elsewhere,
and do not wish to repeat myself here, that a universe which can in principle
be grasped by the concepts of intelligent beings such as ourselves is ultimately best to be accounted for as due to the fiat of an intelligent will; and
the intelligent will supposed to account for the universe is of course what
people commonly mean when they speak of God.ll It does not seem satisfactory in the long run either to deny that the universe has such an intelligible
nature or structure; or to say that it is a mere "brute fact" which does not
need to be accounted for; or to hold, as Kant seems to have done, that the
intelligible nature and structure do not really belong to things in themselves,
but are imposed upon them by human intelligence in the course of coming
to know them. Lewis develops this argument, from an intelligible universe
to an intelligent Creator, in various writings, but especially in Miracles; I
believe it is his most powerful argument for the existence of God.
However, he usually blends it with another argument, which I take to be
distinct from this, to the effect that reason in human beings, if it is to be an
effective tool for knowing the universe, must be independent of the causal
nexus. It was at this point, as Beversluis says, that his argument was attacked
by Elizabeth Anscombe,l2 Miss Anscombe maintained that Lewis's argument
depended on a confusion between what was nonrational and what was irrational. A train of thought is irrational to the degree that it breaks the rules of
logic, omits due consideration of relevant evidence, and so on; to say that it
is determined by nonrational causes is not to say that it is irrational in this
sense. Lewis was sufficiently affected by Miss Anscombe's argument to
rewrite the chapter in Miracles to which it mainly applied. In his revised
argument, he concedes that Miss Anscombe was right to draw a distinction
between the irrational and the nonrational; but insists all the same that a fully
nonrational explanation of our thoughts and actions at the causal level would
be incompatible with their being rational. 13
Beversluis insists that the causal determination of thought has nothing to
do with its rationality, unless it can be shown that there is a correlation
between the particular kind of causal determination involved and irrationality.14 But I do not think that Beversluis quite does justice to Lewis' s revised
argument. One is inclined to say, if human thought, speech and action are to
be genuinely rational, then they must really take place in accordance with
reasons. But if they, or the physical events which underlie or are identical
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with them, are wholly determined by events which are utterly distinct from
reasons, then it is hard to see how they can really take place for reasons.
Perhaps it is misleading to express the point by saying that in some instances
at least human thought and action must really be caused by reasons. But at
least, it seems reasonable at first sight to maintain, persons acting for reasons
must be causes, and it would appear to follow from this that such thought
and action, or the physical events underlying or identical with it, cannot be
totally determined by causes which are other than reasons.
To make the point more sharply, one may ask how, if thoroughgoing determination of a thought or an action, or of its physical analogue, is compatible with its rationality, the reasons are supposed to be related to the causes.
The relationship can hardly be one of logical identity; since it is one thing to
say that a person acted as she did because her neurons fired in a certain way,
another to say that it was in order to convince her hearers of some scientific
or philosophical thesis. But to say that the two patterns of explanation, in
terms of causes and of reasons, just happen to coincide in the relevant instances, as in effect the "Occasionalists" of the seventeenth century did,
seems no more satisfactory; would not the amount of coincidence needed be
quite incredible? And if reason is a mere "epiphenomenon" of underlying
causal determinism, it is difficult to see how it can be really operative in the
world in the way that it must be if our speech and thought, and therefore our
science, are ever to be reasonable. One seems to be left with some form of
mental-physical interaction; with the physical events which underlie our mental life being sufficiently undetermined by their physical preconditions for us
to act and think as we do really because we have good reason to do so. But
this is precisely what Lewis is arguing. The nonrational causes which predispose us to act irrationally, it may reasonably be suggested, do so precisely
because they render it difficult or even impossible for us really to act for
reasons, by more or less totally determining the situation causally. It is not
so much religious superstition, as the real difficulties attendant on the alternative possibilities, which have driven such thinkers as Sir Karl Popper to
champion a form of mind-brain interactionism.
In arguing that the total causal determination of something does not entail that
it cannot be assessed from other points of view, Beversluis takes Beethoven's
quartets as an example. That Beethoven was driven by a psychological compulsion
to produce them, which made him indifferent to such prudential considerations as
that of his health, does not mean that they cannot be evaluated for their qualities
as great music, as he says. IS But this consideration does not appear to me to be
really relevant to Lewis's argument, and that for two reasons. First, the claim that
Beethoven was driven to compose by psychological compulsion does not imply
that every note of every piece that he wrote was determined to be exactly as it
was by such compulsion. Second, to value some human production as an aes-
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thetic object does not seem, at first sight at least, so imperatively to demand
that its producer should have acted for reasons in executing it just as it is, as
to value it as liable to be expressive of the truth about some aspect of the
world.
It may certainly be conceded to Miss Anscombe and to Beversluis that
Lewis should, in the original version of his argument in Miracles, have
distinguished the irrational from the nonrational. It may also be admitted that
it would have been better for Lewis, if he had been writing for professional
philosophers, to have gone further into the ingenious ways in which those
who believe in the compatibility of total causal determination with rational
belief and action have got round the difficulties in their position pointed out
by himself and by others. But none of these concessions imply that Lewis's
argument, especially as revised in the light of Miss Anscombe's objections,
does not have considerable force.
However, as I have said, I think that the nerve of Lewis's argument at this
point is not the independence of rational processes from causality, but rather
the fact that the world is amenable to rational explanation at all. It is claimed
by Beversluis that this commits Lewis to the view, once widely maintained
by philosophers but now as widely rejected by them, that we are directly
aware only of sense-experience, and cannot acquire knowledge of an independently-existing world of material things and other persons except by a
process of inference. But it is absurd, he objects, to deny that we actually see
objects and people; or to maintain that a child has to infer the existence of
his parents and his toys from sense-experiences which are private to him
through some complicated mental process. l6 Now I think that the notorious
philosophical issue of the existence of sense-data is not directly relevant to
the point which Lewis was making, which is that reason is inextricably
involved in our apprehension of the world. Even granted that we do directly
see and feel the tables and chairs in our vicinity, what we can properly be
said to know (that Great Britain has a female Monarch and a male Prime
Minister, that Holland is to the south of Norway), goes far beyond our experience. Here rational inference of some kind, whether we are conscious of
exercising it or not, does seem necessarily involved.
It is true that Lewis does explicitly maintain the view that material objects and
other persons are not the direct objects of sensation, and thus are to be known
only by a kind of inference. l7 But even this view is by no means as indefensible
as Beversluis would have his readers suppose. Certainly it can on first consideration of the matter seem strange to suppose that we ordinarily "infer" from our
sensations to things and people; but this is just because the "inference," if this
is the word, is usually automatic. Unless we are specially on our guard, as for
example in a psychology laboratory or under the influence of drugs, we directly
and spontaneously assume that when we have sensations as though of a tomato
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seen five feet before our eyes, or as though of an oboe playing a melody ten
yards from our ears, there really is a tomato or an oboe placed at that distance
from us. The point of linguistic analysis made by Beversluis is correct as far
as it goes; we are usually said to see actual soldiers, and not khaki-colored
sense-data in our visual field from which we infer the presence of soldiers.
But this is not to provide any solution to the ancient philosophical difficulty
of how, on the basis of our experience, we can come to know about a world
which exists prior to and independently of our experience. All that Beversluis
really establishes is that when we are said to see a tree, it is usually implied
not only that we enjoy visual experiences as though of a tree, but that a tree
is really present where it seems to us to be. Our usual vocabulary of sensation
and perception, that is to say, presupposes the reality of the external world; but
this does not of itself amount to a good argument for the reality of that world.
Beversluis puts it to his readers that Lewis's conception of reason as a kind
of cosmic principle is old-fashioned; in modern times, as he says, a humbler
and more work-a-day role has been assigned to iLls But one may reasonably
ask whether the moderns whom Beversluis commends have really been correct to dismiss the sense of wonder that the universe is amenable to rational
investigation in the kind of way that it apparently is, and must be accepted as
being if we are to take seriously science, or indeed even the most mundane kinds
of inquiry about what is so. As Beversluis sees it, Lewis makes a mystery out
of what is really very simple and straightforward, the application of deductive
and inductive methods to the acquisition of knowledge of the universe. 19 Now
Beversluis not seldom charges Lewis with a certain disingenuousness; one wonders at this juncture whether a similar charge might not plausibly be levelled at
him himself. For every professional philosopher knows that the nature and the
justification of "induction," or at least of the kind of "induction" which, when
complemented by "deduction," tends to yield the truth about the world, is something of puzzle. To say that, apart from deduction, only induction is needed, for
getting to know the truth about things on the basis of observation, is little more
than to admit that we cannot get at the truth by deduction and observation alone,
and to lump together the other methods we need, whatever they are, under the
label "induction."
What is called "induction by simple enumeration" takes the following form:
we have observed a large number of ravens that are black, and have never
observed a raven which is not black; so we infer that all ravens are black.
This sort of argument, for all that we cannot do without it or something like
it if we are to gain knowledge of the world, is itself, as has been well-known
to philosophers since Hume, extraordinarily difficult to justify; and in any
case is quite inadequate as a model to apply to the manner in which the
discoveries of scientists or historians are supposed to be related to the evidence which supports them. In refusing, for reasons such as these, to call the
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methods by which such discoveries are made "inductive" at all, and in denying the validity of "induction,"2o Lewis is thus on firm ground.
It is notorious that a whole host of attempts have been made to get round the
difficulties which Hume raised about "induction," and that none of them have
commanded general acceptance. Some have appealed to its practical success,
which seems question-begging; the problem is its vindication as a method of
securing truth, and not its practical utility. Others have based it upon a metaphysical principle to the effect that nature is basically uniform, which in tum is
"known perhaps, if at all, by faith alone. "21 Popper and his followers have cut
the knot by conceding that Hume has demonstrated the invalidity of induction,
but insisting that science properly speaking does not use "inductive" methods.
Lewis's claim, which Beversluis' arguments do nothing to refute, is to the effect
that a universe which is amenable to the rational methods of inquiry exemplified
in science, whether one calls them "inductive" or not, is satisfactorily to be
explained only as itself due to rational agency.
While we are on the topic of induction, it is worth mentioning the wellknown logical fallacy attributed by Beversluis to Lewis, that of "affirming
the consequent."22 It is to be noted that most "inductive" arguments in the
broad sense, for all that, as I have said, we cannot do without them if we are
to find out anything about the world, may seem at first glance to commit this
fallacy. One could take as an example any claim made in science or history,
in relation to the evidence available in experience which is supposed to
support it. It is, as would be agreed on all hands, grossly superstitious to
suppose that I could strictly speaking deduce such a claim from such evidence
(the loose sense in which expertise in "deduction" is ascribable to Sherlock
Holmes or Mr. Spock is of course quite a different matter). On the other hand,
if, following a procedure which is surely essentially constitutive of science,
I deduce the occurrence of an observable state of affairs or an experimental
result from my theory, and things turn out accordingly, it looks at first sight
as though I can only claim that my theory is confirmed at the cost of committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent. "If A (my theory) then B (the
observation). B; therefore A"-this appears to be the form of my argument;
and that is precisely what it is to commit the fallacy. This is the point made
by Hume and his followers, and expressed by Lewis (and by Popper) in terms
of a denial that "induction" is a valid form of argument.
What then is to be made of "induction" in the broad sense, the kind of
argument other than deduction which we cannot do without in our reasonings
about the world? To cut a very long story short, one has to envisage a range of
possible explanations for any phenomenon, and deduce the observable consequences of each. That possibility may be provisionally accepted as liable to be
true which is not falsified by the relevant observations. To return yet again to
the traditional and well-worn example of the ravens-after observing a number
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of black ravens, and none which are of any other colour, we reach by a flash
of insight the hypothesis that all ravens are black; and this hypothesis is
corroborated by all subsequent observations, in the sense that while any
particular raven might have turned out to be of another colour, none of them
have in fact done so. One may conveniently refer to this kind of "inductive"and-deductive argument as argument to the best explanation. What Lewis's claim
amounts to, is that a universe which is knowable by such a use of reason is itself
best explained as due to rational agency. To envisage Lewis's theistic arguments
in this way is not only charitable but also plausible; it is always perilously easy,
for reasons which I have explained, for controversialists to represent this kind
of argument as involving an elementary logical fallacy.
Before concluding, I would like to deal with two subsidiary points, that
of the so-called "argument from desire" to God, and that to the divinity of
Christ. As to the first matter, Lewis argues, to put it shortly, that we have
desires which cannot be fulfilled by any earthly object or situation, such as
could therefore be met only by something supernatural. Since "nature does
nothing in vain," this supernatural something must exist. 23 I am inclined to
agree with Beversluis in giving very little weight to the principle that "nature
does nothing in vain." One might mean by it that the fact that some or most
people have desires of the kind referred to by Lewis, if indeed they do have
them, is liable to have some explanation from the point of view of evolutionary biology; and I see no reason in principle why some such explanation
should not be forthcoming. I think it can be said that the existence of a desire
such as can only be satisfied by enjoyment of God consorts well with the
view that, as Augustine says, such a being has made us for itself; but the
desire, taken by itself, is only very weak evidence for God. With Beversluis'
other main objection to this claim of Lewis's, however, I have much less
sympathy.24 Beversluis drives a wedge between the God of the Hebrew
Scriptures and New Testament on the one side, and the object of Platonic
and romantic longing on the other; he says that the one has nothing to do with
the other, though admitting that many people have thought that it had.2~ The God
of the bible, he insists, demands repentance from human beings; not just a
determined pursuit of what we already really desire anyway in our heart of hearts.
The experience Lewis claims to have undergone himself, of intense reluctance
at the moment of conversion, is itself incompatible, says Beversluis, with his
identification of God with the real object of our deepest desires. "Either God is
the ultimate object of desire or he is not. If he is, then it makes no sense to
talk about shrinking from him the moment he is found. "26
Beversluis says that Lewis has the bad controversial habit of presenting his
readers with false dilemmas;27 yet the first sentence of that quotation might
be thought to provide an instance of this. What he says seems to underestimate the complexity of human interests and motivations. Does Beversluis
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really think that it is impossible both to want an aching tooth to be extracted,
and to shrink from the touch of the dentist? Is there no such state as that of
being a compulsive drinker, and longing intensely but impotently to kick the
habit? If God is really that to which our deepest desires are fundamentally
oriented, one would have thought that to counteract the puIl of the sum of
more superficial desires would require repentance enough.
The conviction that Platonism is in many respects closely allied to Christianity, for all its opposition to the tenets of classical Protestantism, has so
much prevailed, among the enemies as well as the friends of Christianity,
that it cannot easily be dismissed. Nietzsche's contemptuous gibe against
Christianity, that it was vulgarized Platonism, may have been an exaggeration, but it was surely not an entirely baseless or pointless one. Hans Drs von
Balthasar, moreover, has written at great length of the manner in which
expression of the divine beauty has been a crucial factor in the work of many
or most of the important Christian theologians. 28 If the idea of God as ultimate
satisfaction of human longing were alleged all the same to be unscriptural,
one might allude to several references in the Psalms to God's beauty or
desirableness;29 or for that matter to St. Paul's remark that "our troubles are
light and short-lived; and their outcome an eternal glory which outweighs
them far. "30 I conclude, in favor of Lewis and against Beversluis, that the
idea that we fulfill our deepest desires only in God is not merely compatible
with Christian belief, but probably a rather central component of it. However,
I would add that the mere existence in us of such desires, and the impossibility
of satisfying them with any earthly object, is not particularly strong evidence
for the existence of God, especially when taken in isolation.
I have mentioned that Beversluis often attributes to Lewis the fault of presenting his readers with false dilemmas. The prime example of this, on his account,
is Lewis's claim that Jesus cannot both have falsely believed that he himself was
of divine status, and been a great moral teacher.31 Beversluis argues that the two
questions, of who a human being believes herself to be, and whether or not she
is a great moral teacher, have no bearing on one another.32 I must say that I find
this opinion very strange, for all the vehemence of Beversluis' denunciation of
Lewis for holding the contradictory view. It is to be admitted, it is true, that there
are some false beliefs which a person could hold about herself, and still be a
great moral teacher; for example, that she was some child's aunt, or had just
inherited a small legacy, when in fact she was not or had not. It may also be
conceded, perhaps, that there is no formal incompatibility which can be demonstrated here; but that is about as far as one could plausibly go. Beversluis
suggests, with a show of making whatever concessions to Lewis he can, that
there might be some kind of incompatibility, if the supposed great moral
teacher was deliberately lying to the effect that he was divine. No such
hypothesis is necessary; the case would be just as strong, if not more so, if
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he merely suffered from that greatest of all conceivable delusions of grandeur,
that of falsely believing that he was God.
One may well, of course, argue that Jesus did not in fact, either explicitly
or implicitly, claim divine status for himself; but this would shift the argument
to a different ground. Yet even if Jesus was deluded to the relatively minor
extent of falsely believing that he was the Messiah, the promised deliverer
awaited by his people for hundreds of years, this would surely count rather
considerably against his being a great moral teacher. To be such a teacher
may be supposed to demand a knowledge of human motivations, including
one's own, which is the very opposite of such literally lunatic self-conceit. I
conclude that Lewis's argument is a strong one at this point, if one admits
his premises; granted that Jesus believed himself to be of divine status, and
granted that this belief was false, then it would be very odd, to say the least,
to regard him as a great moral teacher.
What are we to conclude on Lewis's arguments to God from desire, from
morality, and from reason? I think it is fair to say that, if an intelligent ground
of the universe exists which has intentions for human beings, one might expect
it to reveal its will to us through moral conscience; and if it wishes us to come
to enjoyment of it, one might have expected it to have implanted in us a desire
which cannot be satisfied in any other way. But I am inclined to accept
Beversluis' view, that there is nothing in a thorough-going naturalism which
would prevent it from accounting for the existence of these phenomena. On the
matter of morality, Lewis's arguments, in spite of Beversluis' objections, do seem
to me to show that "subjectivist" views of morality are in a sense unsatisfactory.
But the sense in which they are unsatisfactory needs careful scrutiny; Lewis's
arguments tend to show, as it seems to me, not so much that "subjectivist" views
of morality are false, as that we cannot both maintain them with full consistency,
and apply them to our lives in the way that we must if we are to be fully moral
persons. (Perhaps the fact that morality is entirely "subjective" is one of those
things that nice people do not know, unless they are inconsistent as well). Lewis's
view that the amenability of the universe to reason shows that there is something
of a rational nature which underlies it seems to me essentially correct; given this,
there is indeed ground for maintaining that our limitless desire is not in vain,
and that our moral conscience is rightly to be interpreted as reflecting the will
which undergirds the universe.
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